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‘Media Events’ Reconsidered: from ritual theory to simulation and 
performativity 
 




This paper re-examines the long-established notion of ‘media events’ by 
contrasting and critically appraising three distinct approaches to the question of 
media events. These are: ritual theory associated with Daniel Dayan and Elihu 
Katz, secondly, Jean Baudrillard’s approach rooted in his notions of simulation 
and ‘non-events’ and, finally, the more recent performative approaches to media 
and mediation. I take Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska’s reading of media 
events presented in Life After New Media (2012) as exemplary of the 
performative approach. 
 
An argument is made that the accounts of media events offered by performative 
approaches add very little, and, indeed, lack the critical insightfulness of the 
earlier approaches. Both ritual theory and Baudrillard’s thought are briefly 
reappraised and, against Nick Couldry, I try to show that these accounts are not 
characterised by binary and reductive thinking. The major misunderstandings 
concern the nature of the sacred and profane dualism and the further dualisms 
developed in Baudrillard’s thought, particularly the figures of implosion and 
reversibility. Finally, Baudrillard’s position on technology is addressed and the 
paper concludes with the suggestion that his account is not solely negative, since 
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technological developments are not only at the mercy of ironic reversals they 




The idea, long established in media studies, that media play a significant contributory 
role in the construction of events – social, political, historical – rather than merely 
reporting upon or representing independently existing events, is re-examined here. 
The debate concerning ‘media events’ has examined how media professionals, 
companies and technologies do not simply capture, relay, report upon or represent 
events ‘out there’ in the world, but how media bring events into being.1 
 
It is instructive to excavate the recent history of theorisations of ‘media events’ and of 
the ‘mediation’ of reality more generally. While the ‘pre-history’ of a problem can 
often be made to appear laughably inadequate, if only as a rhetorical flourish accruing 
weight to a supposedly ‘new’ or more satisfactory  account, very recent history, the 
only recently discarded or apparently superseded, reveals much about the latest views 
and what they might occlude. Indeed, I will suggest that some newer trends in media 
theorisation of media events lack the critical insightfulness of earlier work. 
 
The notion that many of the ‘events’ presented in the media as news: the Arab Spring, 
acts of war and terror, the plight of refugees seeking a new life in Europe, should be 
understood as ‘media events’ does not allege merely that processes of reporting and 
representing are highly visible, tightly-scripted, prone to bias, or can be made to serve 
a particular ideological agenda or hegemonic view. That much is obvious. More than 
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this, the notion of ‘media events’ suggests that social, political or historical events are 
ultimately inseparable from processes of electronic mediation and dissemination such 
that ‘eventness’ is constituted through mediation. In other words, events do not 
precede, cause or bring about their mediation, but are constituted through and as 
processes of mediation. Put in philosophical terms, events are not ontologically 
distinct or separate from the complex processes of mediation; they come into being 
through the acts, processes and effects of mediation. All three approaches I examine 
here, what I will call the ritual, the simulational and the performative accounts, agree 
on this essential point. Further, none of these approaches doubts that there is a ‘real’ 
or, at least, experiential world beyond media and communication technologies; they 
differ on what the process of mediation involves and where it begins and ends, and on 
the social effects and meanings exerted by media events. 
 
Theories of media events can then, for the sake of clarity and critical discussion, be 
divided into three main approaches or branches of theorisation.
2
 Firstly, there is the 
‘ritual theory’ approach most closely associated with Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz’s 
influential study Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (1992) and with 
Nick Couldry’s text Media Rituals (2003) which revises the earlier account. A second 
approach, often erroneously referred to as ‘Postmodernist’, is based upon Jean 
Baudrillard’s notions of simulation, hyperreality and of media events as ‘non-events’.3 
In the last 15 years or so both approaches seem to have lost ground. Dayan and Katz’s 
work continues to be widely cited and informs more descriptive accounts of media 
events, though the dominant view today is that their theoretical model is dated and 
needs, if not to be abandoned, then supplemented with a sense of the globality and 
diversity of media platforms, particularly Web 2.0 technologies (Couldry, Hepp and 
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Krotz 2010; Mitu and Poulakidakos 2016).  Baudrillard’s approach to media 
continues to provoke and intrigue, though it is widely suggested that his position is 
ultimately nihilistic and even irresponsible (Kellner 1989; Sontag in Chan 2001; 
Kember and Zylinska 2012). In contrast, a third approach which I will term, for 
convenience, the performative, seems to be in ascendance. I will examine the way 
practitioners of this performative approach understand media events in terms of the 
concept of mediation. I take the Bolter and Grusin’s Remediation (1999) and Kember 
and Zylinska’s Life After New Media (2012) to be indicative of the performative 
approach to media and media events. 
 
Against the grain of a number of recent studies of media events (such as Couldry, 
Hepp & Krotz 2010) I will argue that the ritual theory approach has important 
strengths which, increasingly, are unacknowledged. I will offer a brief reappraisal of 
the underpinnings of the ritual approach to media events which reside in Emile 
Durkheim’s social anthropology. Secondly, I will re-assess Baudrillard’s thought on 
simulation, implosion and media ‘non-events’ (Baudrillard does not generally use the 
term ‘media events’) drawing out various threads of misunderstanding. Lastly, I will 
offer a critique of several aspects of performativity theory, in particular, taking issue 
with the way it presents itself as moving beyond binary thinking – which it 
unhesitatingly imputes to other approaches – and its claims to a more adequate or 
fuller understanding of the processes of mediation. I suggest that the performative 
approach loses sight of some of the most radical and suggestive aspects of both ritual 
theory and Baudrillard’s work; the result can be an overly-neat account which 
banishes all excesses, limits, remainders and externalities in its unyielding emphasis 
on process, creativity, co-constitution and relationality. 
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In recent media theory, particularly that which I term performative, the term 
‘mediation’ has gained a wider currency, no longer referring simply to the 
‘betweeness’ characteristic of a representation, state or individual (such as a mediator 
in a dispute) the term mediation takes on a necessary, originary and all-encompassing 
status in assertions such as “all life is mediated’; “we are always, already mediated”: 
in short mediation becomes an ontological category. That is, mediation is presented as 
fundamental reality or ontology, as supplanting all other beings, subjects and 
structures and relegating them to effects of mediation. For example, Kember and 
Zylinska (2012) make a case for thinking in terms of the processes of mediation, in 
preference to Media Studies’ abiding interest in media institutions, objects and 
content: 
 
Mediation does not serve as a translational or transparent layer or intermediary 
between independently existing entities (say, between the producer and 
consumer of a film or TV program). It is a complex and hybrid process that is 
simultaneously economic, social, cultural psychology, and technical. 
Mediation, we suggest, is all-encompassing and indivisible. This is why “we” 
have never been separate from mediation (Kember and Zylinska 2012: xv). 
 
Such assertions of the primacy or originary nature of mediation seem to be, loosely, in 
accord with notions of ‘originary technicity’ associated with readings of Heidegger’s 
influential essay The Question Concerning Technology (orig. 1954) and more recent 
theoretical approaches such as Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory (1993, 2005), 
and the media philosophy of Friedrich Kittler (2009) as well as certain strands of 
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‘New Vitalism’ which reassesses the work of Henri Bergson, Gabriel Tarde and 
others (see Fraser, Kember and Lury 2005). The contention is that human civilisation 
or collective life has always been, fundamentally, about technology; in this view, 
prehistoric tools are considered a technology of mediation, as are speech and writing, 
and so technology must not be seen as new, or as uniquely modern. For Kember and 
Zylinska life, all life, not just human life, is a “being in, and becoming with, the 
technological world” (ibid, emphasis in orig.). 
 
While the assertion of originary technicity or constitutive mediation is a truism, a 
number of further problems emerge or are entailed by some versions of this position. 
The problem is not simply that mediation and technicity becomes meta-terms lodged 
in ontological necessity that suppress or occludes other factors, dimensions or 
accounts. The concept of mediation, as it is used in some strains of performativity and 
vitalist-influenced theory, gathers all within, assimilates everything, claims all as 
hybrid, processual and relational and often fails to look at remainders, exclusions, 
barriers, excesses; at the ‘off grid’ or at the unknown, hidden, not understood. In 
doing so, I will argue that such a theory loses sight of some of the most interesting 
and suggestive work in media theory of recent decades, including ritual theory and 
Baudrillard’s thought on media and communication. I will now examine each of these 
three theoretical approaches in turn. 
 
Ritual Media Events 
 
Two particularly important studies of ‘media events’, Dayan and Katz’s Media Events 
(1992) and Couldry’s Media Rituals (2003), will be briefly re-examined in this 
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section and I hope to unsettle the more or less established view that Couldry’s work 
represents a clear advance over that of Dayan and Katz. Firstly, it is important to 
question Couldry’s reading of Durkheim which guides his reading of some media 
events as media rituals. In discussing ritual, Couldry neglects Durkheim’s 
understanding of the sacred as dual and ambivalent, reducing it to a monolithic set of 
values. Sketching an alternative understanding of Durkheim, I will suggest that a 
particular strand of Durkheim-influenced theory found, for example, in Georges 
Bataille’s writings and in also in Jean Baudrillard’s studies, offers important insights, 
neglected in current theoretical debates on the sacred, ritual, representation and 
mediation. 
 
The most remarkable feature of Dayan and Katz’s study is that they understand the 
role of media in modernity through the duality of the sacred and the profane. Not all 
aspects, dimensions and effects of media, mediation and technology can be subsumed 
to the everyday, profane, ‘rational’ or relational. Media events, as Dayan and Katz 
define them, concern a moment of sacredness, they are “television with a halo” (1992: 
4). Sacredness is manifest as a disruption to profane daily routines; ritual or 
ceremonial media events, which the authors summarise under the headings of 
“contests, conquests and coronations” (1992: 1) suspend the structures of profane life. 
On these occasions viewing becomes almost obligatory, TV programming schedules 
are altered to accommodate the ritual event, even news and current affairs 
programming is pushed aside or becomes, temporarily, a supplement to and summary 
of the ritual media event. Dayan and Katz define ritual media events as pre-planned, 
live, remote, interruptive and “presented with reverence and ceremony” (1992: 7, 
emphasis in orig.). Critical reporting is curtailed during such events which “celebrate 
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not conflict but reconciliation… and evoke a renewal of loyalty to the society and its 
legitimate authority (1992: 8-9, emphasis in orig.). Exemplary events of this kind 
include media coverage of the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana Spencer in 
1981 in the UK and the funeral of J. F. Kennedy in 1963 in the USA, though Dayan 
and Katz’s most fully elaborated example is the state visit of Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977. Media coverage of the Olympic Games and of 





Couldry criticises Dayan and Katz for their over-emphasis on the integrative and 
reconciliatory aspects of media events at the expense of an analysis of ideological 
function of such events. For Couldry media events are fabrications of a sense of the 
‘social centre’ and of shared or hegemonic social values (Couldry 2003: 55-74). Yet, 
Dayan and Katz, in drawing upon Durkheim (1995) and Victor Turner (1969), do 
have a sense of the ambivalence and volatility of collective events which evoke the 
sacred, and how these ritual events can, in themselves, challenge the social authorities 
or simply fade into nothingness, failing to impress the viewing public. The sacred 
does not simply serve or underwrite social order and authority, it contains within it a 
sense of the explosive, the diabolical and shamanistic as Dayan and Katz emphasise 
(1992: 147-187). Rituals can go wrong, they can be performed against order and 
authority (as with magic, Satanism, and counter-cultural gatherings), or, rituals can be 
too effective in unleashing emotions, leading to uncontrollable violence. In later work 
Dayan turns specifically to the question of “disruptive” media events (Dayan in 
Couldry, Hepp and Krotz 2010: 23-31) in a much enlarged sense, including coverage 
of disasters, war or events which are often viewed with cynicism or indifference 
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rather than achieving socially integrative effects. Dayan and Katz then are not 
unaware of the issues of ideology and power, and how those with power attempt to 
seize upon or direct the collective forces evoked by the sacred. What is more 
problematic is that they never really examine how events, whether ‘profane’ news 
events or ‘sacred’ ritual events, can also integrate or unite people through fear, 
disruption and terror. A so-called disruptive media event is also integrative, seeking to 
create a consensus position on the state of the world: as dangerous, terrifying and in 
need of ever-increasing security measures. That is, Dayan and Katz do not sufficiently 
acknowledge the role played, by mainstream media especially, in promoting 
catastrophe and horror, such that these become a routine expectation. Indeed, the 
catastrophe du jour as lead news item provides thrills for audiences, while often 
comforting them that catastrophes happen to the other, not to us. We might call this a 
profanation or routinisation of images of suffering, a topic which is deserving of 
further analysis, but cannot be pursued here. 
 
The underlying theoretical problem is that the application of Durkheim’s approach to 
the relationship between sacred and profane to media, communication and media 
events has come at the cost of great simplification (see also Rothenbuhler 1993). 
Sacred and profane are not binary oppositions in Durkheim’s work, they are mutually 
reinforcing and provide a dynamic alternation within the social system. Neither sacred 
nor profane are unitary or identical: the sacred consists of two tendencies the left and 
right (or impure and pure) sacred which cannot be separated out or demarcated except 
through rituals which effect movements of energy between left and right poles. For 
example, rituals of burial and mourning such as the wake transform the misery, horror 
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and sacred impurity associated with the corpse into the binding together of the living 
through the celebration of a life, the impurity of the corpse purified by fire. 
 
Readings of ritual media events which argue that a sense of sacredness, belonging and 
renewal are activated through these events reduce the sacred to only one of its 
dimensions, the right or pure pole, and reduce the sacred to a binary opposition with 
the profane. This reductive move is, indeed, more evident in the work of Couldry 
(2003) than it is in the work of Dayan and Katz. 
 
Whilst it is clear that Dayan and Katz over-emphasise social cohesion and 
reconciliation at the expense of any sustained analysis of social fractures, polarisation 
or indeed acts of defiance, the authors do set out from the assumption of an 
inseparability of historical and political realities and their mediation as events: 
without media companies and technologies such events would be quite different, they 
insist (1992: vii). Nevertheless, Dayan and Katz generally maintain clear ontological 
distinctions between the event, as planned or staged by organisers, as processed 
through broadcasting of the event and, finally, as received and interpreted by 
audiences of the broadcast event. The authors then offer a triangulation, where the 
moment of broadcasting is less important than the prior staging and planning of the 
event, and less important also than the audiences’ judgements on the broadcast event, 
since audiences, they claim, provide the ultimate measure of how successful an event 
has been. In this account, audiences themselves limit the process of mediation 
involved in the media event. It is this triangular codification, and the sovereign power 
it ascribes to audiences, I suggest, not the use of the category of ritual and the sacred 
per se which undermines the credibility of Dayan and Katz’s work. 
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The notion of distinct, ritual-like ‘media events’ may now seem passé: surely all 
events are ‘media events’ in one way or another? Indeed it has become commonplace 
to assert that, with the advent of ‘new’ and ‘social media’ all users are able to create, 
disseminate and participate in a multiplicity of ‘media events’ according to their own 
choices, preferences and personal connections: with social media we are all our own 
media event. The burgeoning field of ‘events management’ promises that online 
marketing will ‘Bring Your Event to Life’, giving users the option to ‘Create Event’ 
at the click of a mouse (Eventbrite). Perhaps all events from the ‘world-historic’ to the 
micro-level of images of holidays, food and faces are to be considered ‘media events’ 
(or perhaps ‘non-events’), capable of being generated by a medium or platform, of 
being shared almost instantly on social media, and very often as quickly forgotten, at 
least by human users, to be inserted within a personal ‘timeline’ and remembered only 
by the data-mining algorithms of corporate social media platforms (Kitchin 2014). 
 
Indeed, it has, in the last fifteen years or so, become far less common to examine 
media through the notion of ritual, which is now seen as needlessly restrictive, as ill-
equipped to understand the ideological dimensions of media content, and as unable to 
account for the plurality of modes of production, dissemination and reception in so-
called ‘global media ecologies’ (Merrin 2014; Couldry and Hepp 2017). One 
relatively new and influential approach to media can be labelled performativity 
theory. 
 
Performativity: from Media Events to Mediated Becomings 
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Performativity theory is associated with a particular (though narrow) reading of the 
philosophy of Michel Foucault, with the work of Judith Butler on sex and gender 
(1990) and, more recently, with Karen Barad’s discussion of quantum physics and her 
notion of ‘agential realism’ (2007). The broad philosophical position of 
performativity has been applied to media and mediation by Bolter and Grusin (1999) 
while Kember and Zylinska (2012) present a full reading of two media events: the 
credit crunch of 2007/8, and the ‘big crunch’ – the putative final collapse of the 
universe – associated with the scientific experiments using the Large Hadron Collider 
at CERN in Switzerland. I examine, briefly, their reading of these two media events 
below. 
 
The key insight of performativity theory, loosely traceable to Foucault (1979), is that 
‘discourse’ or ‘culture’ produces or enacts the ‘realities’ of which it speaks or writes. 
This means that there are no stable entities or substances prior to cultural inscription, 
and that cultural practices: writing, speaking, measuring, experimenting, actively 
produce and posit the objects, beings, genders, events etc. to which they refer or claim 
to discover and/or faithfully represent.  
 
Some additional features of performativity theory, not salient in Foucault’s work but 
central to the development of this approach, include a focus on materiality, biology 
and the natural world in addition to the study of discourse. There is, in performativity 
theory, a pervasive sense that linguistic approaches to media and culture have gained 
too much ascendancy and now need to be supplemented. There is an attempt to 
overcome the binary structures of linguistic categories and to replace these with an 
emphasis on vitality, hybridity and the blurring of boundaries, and with a sense of 
 13 
temporality and movement rather than more or less fixed structural terms. This move 
often entails an embrace with scientific practices of knowledge production, which 
refuses (rightly) to see such practices as merely the ‘social construction’ of 
knowledge. Scientific practices are not seen as consisting solely as discourse – as sets 
of written claims about knowledge – but also as material engagements: doing, 
manipulating, measuring, anticipating. Further, and closely related, is an increased 
interest in the biological, nature or ‘life’ particularly as it comes into contact with, or 
emerges through, an engagement with technology. There is then, within this body of 
theory, a fairly clear distinction from earlier theoretical approaches to the media: 
critical negation tends to be disparaged in many variants of performativity theory, 
replaced by a sense of emergence, becoming, the inherent vitality of bodies, acts and 
minds (see Braidotti 2013 for example). 
 
These features of thought are not unique to Performative theory, and there are many 
points of overlap with other branches of theory, notably Latour’s Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) and also Post-representational Theory, associated with Thrift (2007) 
and others. At present, my interest is only in how such bodies of theory approach 
media, mediation and media events. When the philosophical position of 
performativity, strongly influenced by new vitalism, is applied to media and 
mediation particular problems arise. There is certainly a risk of neglecting structures, 
such as media ownership and power relations, and also a neglect of the processes of 
commodification, monetisation and of the enhanced regimes of control and 
surveillance enabled by the digital revolution. The over-emphasis on ‘creativity’ and 
vitality in such approaches: media technologies are creative, media users are creative, 
media consumers are creative, and even (media) representations are creative and 
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performative, can lead to the loss of important, critical distinctions. Indeed, critique is 
often considered less important than emphasising open-endedness, fluidity and 
change. Kember and Zylinska promote a dynamic and fluid account emphasising the 
“lifeness” or inherent vitality of media and of mediation, its potential to always create 
new unprecedented effects or connections.
5
 However, Kember and Zylinska have very 
little to say about the often tedious predictability of media content and patterns of 
mediation, the maddening intrusiveness of online advertising: points that could made 
through a critique of capitalism and commodification. Where is this inherent vitality 
of mediation supposed to reside? We might say, following Baudrillard, everywhere 
and nowhere! 
 
Media events are defined, from the perspective of performativity, through the notion 
that media producers, users, and the technologies of mediation they employ, play an 
active and creative role in enacting (not merely shaping) the events which media 
companies and journalists claim to be representing, that is, reporting upon. As a 
starting point this is distinct from Dayan and Katz’s approach, for whom planners, 
producers and audiences shape events, and but how does it relate to Baudrillard’s 
position? Kember and Zylinksa claim to supplement Baudrillard’s idea that 
representation is increasingly undermined by simulation and hyperreality, with 
Bergson’s critique of representation which they present as follows: 
 
Simply, for Bergson, time itself – also understood as duration, movement, 
creative evolution, and life – is what happens, but time cannot be represented. 
Any act or attempt at representation transforms time into space by cutting into 
the flow of reality and turning something that moves into something that is 
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still (a photograph) or that only looks like it is moving (a film) (Kember and 
Zylinska 2012: 43). 
 
In other words, time, and the time of events, is always and by definition in excess of 
representation. Applying this insight to the credit crunch as media event the authors 
argue that the great complexity of this event, made up of numerous shadowy and 
difficult to grasp processes: “securitization, debt bundling, junk bonds, liquidity, 
hedge funds, vanilla loans, quantitative easing, and so on” (2012: 47) cannot be 
represented and so are substituted by simple and obvious representations. These 
greatly simplified representations include computer graphics featured on news reports, 
images of long queues outside The Northern Rock as panicked customers seek to 
withdraw funds, and above all, the dapper figure of celebrity journalist Robert Peston, 
known for his curiously drawling tones and over-long, narcissistic reports for 
corporate media companies. 
 
Such an analysis seems to add very little to the previous approaches: the credit crunch 
is read as a disruptive news event in which simulacra or images are used to replace or 
supplant detailed analysis. While the ‘event’ of the credit crunch concerns many 
different agencies and materialities – technical, human, organisational – 
representational devices are used by the mainstream media to produce the event as a 
fairly straightforward, representable, reality. Yet, such a simplification or codification 
within representation is undoubtedly effective and powerful, indeed we might say it is 
hyper-effective, that it enacts hegemony (Baudrillard 2009). But what might have 
been silenced or occluded in this performative reading? For Baudrillard it is the 
uncertainty, negativity, paradox and ironic reversals: Peston became a celebrity, but 
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the notion of the expert commentator was further discredited, perhaps feeding wider 
social disaffection and indifference. Paul Mason emerged as the designated critical 
voice at the BBC, while Peston appeared in style magazines and was feted for his 
hairstyle. Are these processes part of the inherently ‘lifeness’ of mediation, or of its 
deathly tendency to trivialise, or “carnivalise” all values and perspectives? And what 
of the sufferings and humiliations brought about by a crisis in capitalism that is 
obscured by its being labelled the ‘credit crunch’ or ‘financial crisis’? 
 
While critical or political critique may not be central to performativity theory, this 
body of thought does make strong claims for its ethicality. While journalists, such as 
Peston, tend to deny their role in promoting and enacting a certain version of 
eventness, the more ethically robust position would be to acknowledge this 
constitutive role, and so be forced to acknowledge a degree of responsibility. Butler 
and Barad (2007), as well as Kember and Zylinska (2012), seem quite certain that 
performative approaches do not merely constitute an intellectual ‘advance’ over other 





In the case of the events produced within the Large Hadron Collider, Kember and 
Zylinksa re-iterate the standard ANT position: the phenomena being analysed – in this 
case, waves and particles – cannot be captured or even visualised by human beings, 
and so advanced computing is used to trace the ‘smoking gun’ left behind, allegedly, 
by the collision of particles. This advanced computing technique then is very much 
part of the event of particle collision. Once again, a celebrity presenter, in this case 
Prof. Brian Cox, serves as the representational focal point for lay audiences who, it is 
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assumed, could not understand the complexity of the processes involved. Yet, for 
Kember and Zylinska, the likes of Peston and Cox do not obscure the absence, 
implosion or disappearance of an event, as they feel Baudrillard would suggest, 
rather: 
 
What is at stake in proposing, instead, a performative and productive 
entanglement between media and events is precisely their shared vitality? If a 
programmed event cannot constitute the event’s occurrence, it can co-
constitute it … Events are not imploded in the media; instead they are 
transformed through mediation. Mediation does not posit a reciprocal end 
game – the “dissolution of TV into life, the dissolution of life into TV” 
[Baudrillard] – but rather a productive relationality that is not an end point in 
history, but part of its creative evolution” (Kember and Zylinska 2012: 65). 
 
The notion of ‘creative evolution’ drawn from Bergson is left vague, and what is far 
from clear is how the inherent creativity of human life relates to the supposedly 
inherent creativity of non-human actors and processes: is it the same; is it one, a 
naturalism or universal creativity? This approach seems seriously lacking in 
conceptual differentiation: what range of phenomena and effects are covered by the 
term “co-constitution”?7 The experiments with the Large Hadron Collider are not, at 
any given point considered newsworthy, they are rather placed in reserve, or 
immersed in simulation, cryogenically frozen, awaiting a dose of publicity. And what 
is the cost to science in its becoming a media event? Can excessive mediatory self-
promotion not devitalise an event – or even an academic discipline such as Physics – 
as much as, or alongside, co-constituting it?  
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Not surprisingly, Kember and Zylinska reject Baudrillard for being “too nihilistic” 
(ibid). Yet, the “dissolution” he sketches is not teleological, not an end-point in 
history. Rather it is the end of history and politics, understood in representationalist 
terms, and marks the triumph of a particular phase of mediation which Baudrillard 
terms simulation. These are important distinctions, to be examined in more detail 
below. Indeed, mediation, as Kember and Zylinska present it – as all encompassing, 
constitutive and inherently creative – can be diagnosed as a symptom of the effects of 
simulation and implosion, and such mediation may well be ‘creative’ in some non-
specific or derisory sense. In other words, Kember and Zylinska’s account can be seen 
as itself performing or enacting an implosion of reality and mediation, in much the 
way that Baudrillard’s theory suggests is a leading characteristic of contemporary life 
and thought. In the final section I will re-read Baudrillard against Kember and 
Zylinska and their attempt to transcend earlier approaches to media events. 
 
Baudrillard: Simulation, Non-Events and Disappearance 
 
Baudrillard’s interest in media and mediation dates back to his early work. Requiem 
for the Media (originally 1972) considered the event of May 1968 and the operations 
of the mainstream media which reduced this explosive or “singular” event to a 
spectacle to be consumed. The intensity and revolutionary energy of this event was 
drained away by mass media coverage: the corporate media seized upon it “to 
administer a mortal dose of publicity … depriving it of its own momentum” 
(Baudrillard 1981: 174). Baudrillard does not claim that there can a pure or pristine 
event, untouched by any mediation, indeed the revolutionaries of May 1968 deployed 
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their own media: speech, hand-made placards, silk-screen printing but above all, 
Baudrillard suggests, by exchanging looks, glances and acts of defiance which move 
faster, and so can be more effective, than any ordered, electronic communication 
(Baudrillard 1990: 8). Yet, there was also a complicity of the revolutionaries in the 
media promotion of the event; once leaders took themselves for ‘the event’ and 
produced messages with the express purpose of relaying them a vital immediacy was 
lost, Baudrillard asserts. His contention is that a genuine rupture of the social and 
political system cannot be relayed through the system’s media channels without 
succumbing to the abstract form imposed by electronic mediation; that is, the event 
becomes ‘content’ carried by the commodity sign form: an abstracted “ecstatic” 
dizzying succession of images and text on screens. 
 
May 1968 was not a simulatory “non-event” for Baudrillard, but a “singularity” – an 
indefinable, inexhaustible event that cannot be forgotten, that is never fully absorbed 
by simulation and the ramifications of which are still felt today. While most news 
events are, for Baudrillard “non-events”, what exactly does he mean by non-event? 
 
The non-event is not when nothing happens. It is, rather, the realm of 
perpetual change, of a ceaseless updating, of an incessant succession in real 
time, which produces this general equivalence, this indifference, this banality 
that characterises the zero degree of the event (Baudrillard 2005: 95). 
 
Events are not merely anticipated, modelled, filtered, and played out according to the 
scripts of media companies, there is a more fundamental issue: the sheer excess of 
mediated information concerning an event neutralises its intensity, creating an 
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unstable play of meaning and meaninglessness which produces, ultimately, reactions 
of indifference and of an oppressive banality, an indifference that itself serves 
hegemony (Baudrillard 2009). 9/11 was, for Baudrillard, also a singular event: 
unanticipated, unintelligible, momentous. Global media companies relayed hundreds 
of repetitions of the images of the twin towers collapsing, with endless varieties of 
follow-up stories, film and documentary, the event was not allowed to end, to 
conclude, to become historic, it was placed within what Baudrillard terms the “infinite 
trajectory” of the media. Nevertheless, and despite these techniques of semiotic or 
informational neutralisation, the singularity of this event could not be conjured away 
(Baudrillard 2002). 
 
What then does Baudrillard mean by simulation? Firstly, it must be stressed that there 
is nothing fake, false, imaginary or unreal about simulation in Baudrillard’s usage. 
Rather, simulation comes about as the real – which is only ever an effect or artifice of 
representation – is abstracted, designated and technologically reproduced as a fully-
functional model. In simulation, the effect of the ‘real’ (or ‘reality’) is expanded 
beyond all limits, it need not be contrasted with imagination, fantasy, art or literature; 
it need not be referred back to a ‘real’ or referent, its technological capture and 
reproduction over-reaches itself in striving for perfection: more pixels, higher 
resolution, next generation, an excess of the real. When the effect of the real is 
technologically generated, or modelled by simulation (rather than mechanically 
produced – the Bayeux tapestry or Gutenberg bible are representations, but not 
simulations), there is an “implosion” of the medium (signification) and reality, 
Baudrillard contends. Implosion does not mean that the imploded terms are lost or 
destroyed, but that they can no longer readily be isolated, contrasted or opposed. The 
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notion of implosion is a way of thinking beyond oppositions and binaries, but unlike 





The effect of the real was a phase or order within European culture established by 
particular apparatuses of representation: Platonic philosophy, linear perspective, 
scientific instruments such as the telescope which creates the sense of Earth as thing 
to be looked at (Baudrillard 2010: 10-11). As the ‘real’ is posited through increasingly 
complex techniques of abstraction it loses its self-evidence, it becomes artefactual. As 
an artefact, the effect of the real is subject to further processing and synthesising by 
new technologies: radio, television and more fundamentally, for Baudrillard, 
cybernetics, digital media and advanced computation. Indeed, if the real is always 
already mediated and mediation is originary – as performativity theory contends – 
then everything is real, or, put differently, reality is in excess. This is precisely the 
condition Baudrillard terms hyperreality (Baudrillard 1994: 19-27). 
 
It is little noted that Baudrillard was comfortable with phrases such as “brute reality” 
and “the world as it is” (Baudrillard 2010: 11) to express the idea of a state of the 
world before, beyond or outside of representation and simulation, a world “without 
us”. Nevertheless, the contention that there are distinct forms of mediation, or orders 
of simulacra, and that the broad cultural tendency for a shift away from representation 
towards simulation is crucial. Simulation becomes dominant (without destroying or 
supplanting representation or iconography) when images, data, objects, content, 
events are produced from programmes, codes, models, stereotypes.
9
 These codes or 
models are not ‘real’, they are operational or technical abstractions. They are also 
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ideological in the sense that they allow an avoidance of the real and facilitate social 
control at a level which denies the real (Baudrillard 1994). Real, in this sense, means 
only that of which a convincing representation can be produced. 
 
Baudrillard is clear that during news coverage of disasters, war and terror, 
occasionally the ‘reality’ and dignity of suffering appears through the simulation 
models and informational effects generated by corporate media’s saturation coverage. 
A discussion of the bombardment of Sarajevo, by Serbian forces in 1993, makes this 
point (Baudrillard 1994: 54-61; 2002: 45-50). However, it is not the case, for 
Baudrillard, that ‘fake’ imagery or media hype obscures the reality that exists behind 
them. Rather the reality of suffering is not given time or space to be represented as 
such – victims are dispossessed of the means to represent their suffering. Instead 
suffering and victimhood are coded as a series of images to be factored into the 
‘media event’ as and when required, to supplement or intensify the dominant 
narratives of Western superiority, compassion or rather, for Baudrillard, pity or 
condescension. Indeed, images of suffering are a useful commodity to news 
companies and are also deployed to manage the problem of the simulacra, to make 
things appear really, undeniably real (2002: 46) and to obscure the presence of 
carefully crafted simulations. Media companies feed off the ‘realities’ they produce, 
exploiting those caught up in events, mining them for signs of reality. Indeed, for 
Baudrillard, “all the media live off the presumption of catastrophe and the succulent 
imminence of death” (1994: 55). Here Baudrillard breaks with the Durkheimian-
underpinnings of approaches to media, such as those of Dayan and Katz, for whom 
media are socially-integrative. Nevertheless, the notion of ritual returns in 
Baudrillard’s rituals of transparency, these are collective yet ironic and unanticipated 
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responses to life under regimes of intensive mediation. Examples might include 
children and students defying authority and sociability by appearing, or acting as if, 
immersed in their smart phones even when they are not, or, public rituals of 
commemoration, mourning or ‘solidarity’ played out for eager corporate media 
institutions, from which nothing can be deduced of the feelings, attitudes or intentions 
of the participants (Baudrillard 1988: 29-44). 
 
Recently, media theorists have contrasted Baudrillard’s notion of simulation to 
mediation, arguing that the concept of simulation does not properly capture or 
acknowledge the performativity and creativity of all media and all mediation (Bolter 
and Grusin 2000; Massumi 2002: 137; Kember and Zylinska 2012: 38-41). However, 
simulation models are dynamic, creative and, indeed, performative; this is what makes 
them such effective means of control. Moreover, as I have suggested, from 
Baudrillard’s perspective ‘mediation’ as construed by performativity theory can be 
seen as a symptom of simulation and implosion; the concept of mediation collapses 
distinctions associated with representational thinking and discovers itself everywhere, 




Baudrillard’s later work, concerning the putative Fourth Order, develops the concepts 
of disappearance, telemorphosis and integral reality. Reality is not destroyed, 
obscured or forgotten, rather it proliferates to excess, moving beyond the limited and 
separate models and codes of simulation and hyperreality to an integral state: “integral 
reality” (Baudrillard 2005: 17-24). The phenomenon of reality TV is one of 
Baudrillard’s major examples of “telemorphosis”, the transformation of reality 
through electronic mediation such that the action of the medium on reality can no 
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longer be isolated, separated or contrasted with reality. Reality appears as 
immediately telemorphic; we expect there to be images, video, footage of everything 
and anything that is real, if these are not available the ‘reality’ of a thing or event is 
immediately thrown into doubt. A written or discursive (representational) account is 
no longer enough to convince us of the presence of ‘reality’. 
 
It is in a discussion of an early Reality TV show that Baudrillard uses the phrase 
“dissolution of life in TV, dissolution of TV in life” (Baudrillard 1994: 30), the phrase 
vilified by Kember and Zylinska. Baudrillard’s phrase, a characteristic rhetorical 
reversal, is an illustration of the effects of simulation and implosion; it expresses the 
point that life is, indeed, mediated, but Baudrillard does not universalise mediation, he 
differentiates between representation, simulation and virtual or integral reality. While 
we are all at the mercy of the culture of telemorphosis, we also resist it and exploit it. 
We do not resist it only as an external enemy to be held back, but as an “immanent” 
mode of disappearance. Televised and online identities are never real, never true; the 
signs of truth are manipulated by producers and programmers in a staging of truth, yet 
performers and participants can, ritualistically, disappear behind this staging, or can, 
in turn, re-stage the staging of truth. The technological condition then, which, very 
loosely speaking, may be considered “originary” or constitutive, as performative 
theorists insist, is also, for Baudrillard a mode of escape and disappearance, a means 





Ritual media events, in Dayan and Katz’s sense, are perhaps disappearing. Yet ritual 
media events continue to disappear – into news, into social media, into ubiquity – 
without being eliminated; this disappearance or transformation perhaps takes the form 
to which Baudrillard refers: a disappearance by excess, by over-realisation and 
implosion. 
 
Kember and Zylinska, in promoting their revised-version of performativity theory, 
mistakenly impute a binary structure to the thinking of Dayan and Katz, and to also 
Baudrillard, however neither the sacred and profane distinction nor Baudrillard’s 
position can be characterised as binary, as I have argued above. Sacred and profane 
are an ambivalent, volatile duality, while ambivalence and reversibility are central to 
Baudrillard’s notions of singularity, disappearance and rituals of transparency.  
 
Baudrillard does not so much offer an alternative reading of ‘media events’ – a 
competing theory for the media studies textbooks – as a dislocation of the notion of 
‘media events’ through the figures of non-events, reversal and disappearance.  For this 
reason, Baudrillard’s concept of simulation should not be interpreted as providing a 
‘model’ for the reading of media events, indeed Baudrillard refuses to provide an 
abstract, operation model for the interpretation of media events as such a model would 
be no more than an exercise in simulation. 
 
It is then important to be cautious when directly comparing different theoretical 
constructions or engagements with ‘media events’. Perhaps one implication of these 
very different approaches to media and mediation is that there cannot be a universal or 
general theory of mediation or of media events. The different approaches are able to 
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reveal, theorise or, in the language of performativity produce and enact certain effects, 
while necessarily occluding others. The attempt by Couldry, Hepp and Krotz (eds 
2012: 1-20) to legislate a ‘correct’ way of reading media events is both disappointing 
and inherently problematic. In contrast, Dayan and Katz’s approach undoubtedly 
captures something of the auratic in certain orchestrated or ritual media events, this 
may be sneered at or rejected yet is it is also palpable, however short-lived.  
 
Baudrillard’s reading of media “non-events” may appear to be generally negative 
about technology, yet he is quite insistent that technology also offers a mode of 
escape and disappearance. Simulation models are dynamic and vital, capable of 
growing, assimilating and neutralising dissent: this is their ultimate purpose. Kember 
and Zylinksa simplify and reduce the accounts presented by both Dayan and Katz and 
Baudrillard in order to strengthen their case for a new or superior account. I have 
argued that their account adds very little to the earlier approaches and, indeed, loses 
sight of some of the most revealing features of them. 
 
Media events continue to be fascinating, and to make new demands on theorists. 
Perhaps media events will disappear, but disappear by excess into ubiquity; something 




1) The notion of the ‘media event’ has many precursors, and a complex 
genealogy, of particular importance is Daniel Boorstin’s The Image: A Guide to 
Pseudo-Events in America first published in 1961. Boorstin describes the increasingly 
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important image management industry and how it is used by the powerful to influence 
what appears on the television news. It is an important study, yet it is clear that for 
Boorstin a pseudo-event can be fairly sharply distinguished from a genuine, real 
world historic event – a war or crisis that cannot easily be stage-managed by elites. 
Boorstin’s position lives on but chiefly as a soft target from which writers will launch 
their own supposedly superior view. 
2) In this paper, I will be only secondarily concerned with examples of particular 
‘media events’, my interest is in competing branches of theory. 
3) Baudrillard’s ideas have, of course, already been assimilated into media 
studies but often at the cost of simplification and misunderstanding. In contrast, 
Genosko (1999) and Merrin (2005) build on Gane’s earlier discussions (1991a, 
1991b), emphasising the influence of McLuhan on Baudrillard’s media theory and 
making a case for Baudrillard’s approach in preference to Marxist and audience 
centred accounts. My concern here is to contrast Baudrillard’s thought with the more 
recent performative and vitalist approaches.  
4) Dayan and Katz distinguish between a happening or an occurrence and the 
making of media events. To speak of a happening or an occurrence can be said to be 
already mediated by language, but a ‘media event’ is much more than this. The 
making of a media event involves decisions by journalists, editors and technicians; 
these are shaped by ownership, regulation and commercial interests which together 
produce an event for consumption and for electronic mediation. 
5) There is a strong measure of what Noys (2010) calls affirmationism in such 
performative theory, a sense that critique, in and of itself, is too negative, too hostile, 
indeed rather offensive to inherently creative media users, and also, that critique and 
critics take themselves far too seriously. Kember and Zylinska seem quite certain, 
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indeed, proud to assert that to be interested in Derrida, Deleuze or any other 
theoretical master or mistress, is acceptable only if it allows us to “respond to the 
multiple flows of mediation” (2012: xvi). 
6) Kember and Zylinska’s claims for the ethical superiority of performativity 
theory are sketchy and disappointing. They draw heavily upon the feminist physicist 
Karen Barad’s (2007) notion of “intra-action”, a form of relationality that insists that 
entities have no separate being or identity prior to or separable from their contingent 
intra-action. Whether or not this is the case for quantum waves, when applied to the 
ethics of human life by Kember and Zylinska it seems to amount to little more than an 
injunction for an ongoing awareness of our responsibilities to each other and to the 
natural world: good advice but hardly groundbreaking. 
7) For Kember and Zylinska there is nothing outside of mediation, nothing 
outside of the creative evolving of flows and cuts within flows. Dayan and Katz 
(1992) and Couldry (2002) are thereby rejected for being too constructionist, for 
separating ‘media’ from ‘society’ and then focussing on how media construct, shape, 
influence social processes. It is worth noting that after offering a performative/vitalist 
reading of media events, later in their study Kember and Zylinksa attempt a synthesis 
of performativity and critique, but only on condition that critique remodels itself as 
performative (2012: 173-200). Kember and Zylinska’s account is perhaps at its most 
wobbly when they refer vaguely to “Durkheim’s religious sociology’ – conflating the 
sociological study of religion with a religious perspective on society (Kember and 
Zylinska 2012: 31&33). The problem here is that Dayan and Katz (1992) and Couldry 
(2002) already operate with a reductive account of Durkheim’s thought on the sacred 
and ritual, which is only exacerbated by Kember and Zylinska’s reading. All these 
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writers neglect Durkheim’s emphasis on the dual or ambiguous nature of the sacred 
(Durkheim 1995: 303-417). 
8) Baudrillard’s work examined the collapsing together or implosion of media 
events and news events, indeed this is only one of a series of implosions: of signifier 
and referent or image and reality; of medium and message; of event and mediation; of 
site and studio; of actors and spectators in a process he terms simulation. 
9) Baudrillard’s distinction between simulacra and simulation is often 
misunderstood, or the terms are conflated. Baudrillard’s work challenges the 
distinction, made by Plato in The Sophist, between icons, which are images that 
capture or partake in the Idea of the original – for example religious icons – and 
simulacra which are merely semblances and do not participate in the true Idea of the 
original. For Baudrillard the attempt to distinguish between icons and simulacra, and 
to maintain a strict, hierarchical relation between them, can never be made solid and 
durable. It can always be challenged or undermined in a number of ways. For example 
simulacra can be so artfully produced that they overpower the original, even that they 
suggest the original Idea is itself simulacral. This is the case with the history of 
institutional Christianity, Baudrillard maintains (1994: 4-5). As the distinction 
between icons and simulacra is so unstable, there are several phases in the historical 
attempt to order and discipline simulacra. These are summarised by Baudrillard’s four 
orders of simulacra. Simulation appears in the third order of simulara with the advent 
of cybernetics, molecular biology and electronic media and communications. 
10) Indeed, why single out particular media(tion) events, such as the credit crunch 
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